Introduction
The 2024 Company Law, in force since 1 July 2024, changed the personal-liability map for the people who run Chinese companies — and for the foreign parents that appoint them. Directors and senior managers now face codified duties of loyalty and care, a new direct liability to third parties, and exposure alongside controlling shareholders and actual controllers who pull the strings. For a foreign parent that names a director to its China subsidiary, the practical question is no longer only "what does the company owe" but "what does the individual owe, and when can they be sued personally."
The duties of loyalty and care
Article 180 states the two duties in general terms. Directors, supervisors and senior managers owe the company a duty of loyalty — they must avoid conflicts between their own interests and the company's and must not use their powers to seek improper personal gain — and a duty of care — in performing their duties they must exercise the reasonable care that a manager would ordinarily exercise in the company's best interests. The same article extends the duties to a controlling shareholder or actual controller who does not formally serve as a director but actually manages the company's affairs, the "de facto director" rule that reaches foreign parents who run the subsidiary directly.
The prohibited acts
Articles 181 to 184 give the loyalty duty teeth by listing what a director cannot do: Article 181 absolutely prohibits misappropriating company property, diverting funds, storing company funds in a personal account, taking bribes or other illegal income, pocketing commissions from dealings with the company, and disclosing company secrets without authorization; Article 182 regulates self-dealing and connected transactions, which require reporting and approval by the board or the shareholders' meeting under the articles; Article 183 prohibits seizing a corporate opportunity unless reported and approved or the company cannot lawfully use it; and Article 184 prohibits competing with the company without the same approval. A foreign-appointed director who also sits on the board of a competitor, or who routes a transaction through an affiliate, sits squarely inside these rules.
Liability to the company and to third parties
Two provisions carry the exposure. Article 188 makes a director, supervisor or senior manager who breaches law, regulation or the articles of association and causes loss to the company liable for damages. Article 191, a new addition in the 2024 law, extends the exposure outward: where a director or senior manager, in performing duties, causes damage to another person, the company is liable for the damage, and where the director or senior manager acted with intent or gross negligence, they are also liable. The provision covers directors and senior managers (not supervisors) and is generally understood as supplementary — the company pays first, the culpable individual answers for intent or gross negligence. "Another person" is read to include creditors, employees and consumers, and whether shareholders are covered remains debated. For a foreign investor, Article 191 is the provision that turns a subsidiary's insolvency into a personal claim against its appointed officers.
Derivative suits: who can sue the directors
Shareholders police directors through the derivative action in Article 189. For a limited liability company, any shareholder may sue in the company's interest; the 180-day, 1% shareholding threshold applies only to companies limited by shares. The precondition is a written demand to the supervisory board (or the board, where the supervisors themselves are the target) that goes unsatisfied, unless the situation is urgent. A foreign minority shareholder in a China joint venture therefore has a standing route against a misbehaving director, and the demand-and-wait step is a procedural gate that must be observed.
Shadow directors, de facto directors and the parent's exposure
The 2024 law also closes the gap between the person who is formally appointed and the person who actually calls the shots. Article 192 provides that a controlling shareholder or actual controller who instructs a director or senior manager to engage in conduct harming the company or the shareholders is jointly and severally liable with that director or senior manager. Combined with the de facto director rule in Article 180(3), this means a foreign parent that runs its China subsidiary's day-to-day affairs — approving transactions, directing payments, overriding the board — can be treated as a director and held to the same duties, and can be jointly liable for the harm it instructed. For foreign parents accustomed to centralized control, this is the provision that changes the governance conversation.
Capital, board and liquidation exposure
The liability extends into three other moments. Article 51 requires the board to verify and call in capital contributions, and makes the directors responsible for losses caused by failing to do so; Article 53 makes the responsible directors, supervisors and senior managers jointly and severally liable with a shareholder who withdraws contributed capital; and Article 125 makes directors who participate in a board resolution that violates law, regulation or the articles — and causes serious loss — liable, with an escape for a director who recorded a dissent. The most consequential change for a foreign parent closing a subsidiary is Article 232: directors, not shareholders, are now the liquidation obligors, and a director who fails to form the liquidation group in time and causes loss to the company or its creditors bears personal liability. A director who resigns and walks away without addressing liquidation may be walking into a claim.
What a foreign-appointed director should do
- Separate the parent's instructions from the director's own duties; document board approvals for connected transactions, opportunities and competition.
- Record dissent to any board resolution that looks unlawful — the dissent is the defense under Article 125.
- Verify capital contributions and chase the call-in obligations, because Article 51 makes silence a liability.
- On any closure or insolvency, treat the Article 232 liquidation duty as personal and time-bound, not administrative.
- Assume the parent's de facto management can trigger the Article 180(3) and Article 192 rules, and structure governance accordingly.
This article is provided by Tianni Law Firm for general information only and does not create an attorney-client relationship. For legal advice on a specific matter, please contact a qualified attorney.
Understand your China directors' and officers' personal exposure.
We advise foreign-invested companies and their appointed directors and officers on duties, indemnification and defense under China's 2024 Company Law.


