China Antitrust Private Damages Actions: A Guide for Foreign Companies

The following is general information on Chinese antitrust litigation, not legal advice for any specific claim. Article numbers and thresholds are applied on the facts of each case; consult qualified counsel before acting.

The 2022 Anti-Monopoly Law and its private right of action

China's Anti-Monopoly Law (中华人民共和国反垄断法) was first adopted on 30 August 2007 and took effect on 1 August 2008. It was amended on 24 June 2022, with the revision effective on 1 August 2022, and the statute now runs to 70 articles across eight chapters, up from 57. The private damages claim sits in Article 60 — formerly Article 50 — which provides that a business operator whose monopolistic conduct causes loss to others bears civil liability in accordance with law. The 2022 revision added a second paragraph: a procuratorate at or above the prefecture-city level may bring a civil public-interest lawsuit. For a foreign company, that means the private route is now both individual and, in public-interest form, potentially prosecutor-led.

Stand-alone versus follow-on claims

A claimant does not need a prior administrative decision to sue — a stand-alone claim is permitted directly before a court. Alternatively, a follow-on claim can ride on an enforcement outcome. The operative judicial interpretation is the Supreme People's Court's Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Monopoly Civil Dispute Cases (法释〔2024〕6号), adopted on 4 February 2024, published on 24 June 2024 and effective 1 July 2024, in 51 articles, which repealed the 2012 interpretation (法释〔2012〕5号). Its Article 2 moved the follow-on trigger earlier: from when an enforcement decision "becomes effective" to when it "is made". Practically, a company that has been squeezed by a cartel can sue now, and one that wants to wait for the SAMR's finding can attach to it sooner than before.

Monopoly agreements versus abuse of dominance

The two heads of claim are separate chapters with separate proof. "Monopoly agreements" are Chapter II: Article 16 defines them, Article 17 covers horizontal agreements among competitors, and Article 18 covers vertical agreements. "Abuse of market dominance" is Chapter III: Article 22 defines it, Article 23 lists the factors, and Article 24 sets the presumptions. The presumptions matter because they shift the work: a single firm with a 50% or greater share is presumed dominant; two firms together at two-thirds, or three firms together at three-quarters, are likewise presumed; below 10% there is no presumption. On vertical resale-price maintenance, Article 18 prohibits fixing or setting minimum resale prices, allows the operator to prove the conduct has no anti-competitive effect, and adds a new safe harbour for vertical agreements below a market-share threshold — a threshold that, as of this writing, the enforcement agency has not finally fixed, so it should be verified against current rules.

Limitation, interruption and damages

The limitation period is the Civil Code's three years under Article 188. Under the 2024 interpretation (Article 49), a complaint to the enforcement agency interrupts the limitation period; if the agency declines, withdraws or terminates the matter, the period recommences. For continuing monopolistic conduct, damages are calculated three years back from filing. Remedies run to damages plus an order to cease the infringement, and the public-interest route sits alongside. The strategic point for a foreign claimant is to time the administrative complaint and the civil suit together, so that neither the limitation period nor the evidence is lost.

Practical steps for a foreign company

• Identify the correct head of claim — a cartel is Chapter II, a squeeze by a dominant supplier or platform is Chapter III — because the proof differs.
• Decide stand-alone or follow-on early, now that the 2024 interpretation lets a follow-on claim attach from the moment a decision is made.
• Preserve the three-year clock under Civil Code Article 188, and use the agency-complaint interruption deliberately.
• Map the dominance presumptions under Article 24 before spending on an abuse-of-dominance theory.
• Check the safe-harbour threshold for vertical agreements against the current enforcement rules before relying on it.

The procedure above is current as of the date of writing and applied on the facts of each case; the summary is general information, and article numbers should be confirmed against the official text. For the public-enforcement side, see China antitrust investigations: SAMR dawn raids and what they mean for foreign companies, and for the adjacent unfair-competition regime, see China anti-unfair competition law and trade-secret protection.